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Abstract
Do active earnings-driven intermediaries have a significant role to play in dynamic
economies, even in the absence of transactions costs and asymmetrical informa
tion? This paper shows that the answer is "yes" for the overlapping generations
(OG) economy. This role is not recognized in traditional OG models because an
overly restrictive definition of equilibrium is used which rules out the possibility
of positive earnings for intermediaries a priori. Using a simple illustrative OG
model, it is shown that positive earnings are possible for intermediaries when the
definition of equihbrium is relaxed to that which is standard for general equi-
hbrium models with finitely many agents and finitely many goods. Moreover,
the set of equiUbria then depends upon the actions taken by the intermediary.
In particular, the incorporation of an active earnings-driven intermediary can
reduce, or even eliminate, the possibility of inefficient equilibria. These findings
suggest that the OG model is incomplete without an explicit description of the
intermediation process.
"Pingle: Department ofEconomics, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557; Tesfatsion; Department of
Economics and Department ofMathematics, Iowa State University, Ames, lA 50011-1070. The authors are
grateful to Jo Anna Gray for helpful comments.
tIntroduction
Trade and credit arrangements in modern market economies are primarily accomplished
through active earnings-driven intermediaries such as retail stores, banks, and brokerage
firms. Understanding the effects which the actions of intermediaries can have upon the alloca
tion of resources is therefore of considerable importance. Nevertheless, the primary paradigm
currently used in economics to study the genered system-wide allocation of resources—the
Walrasian general equilibrium model—typically incorporates at most three types of agents
in explicit form: consumers; producers; and government policymakers. The intermediation
process is rarely articulated.
Consider, for example, the traditional Walrasian general equilibrium model consisting of
finitely many consumers, finitely many producers, and finitely many goods. To date, this
model has largely been used to focus on the role of price systems as resource allocation
mechanisms. Any intermediaries which might exist to facilitate exchange are not recognized
as earnings-driven agents whose actions could have an impact upon equilibrium outcomes.
The only intermediary in the model is an implicit "Walrasian Auctioneer" who passively
calls out prices until coordination is achieved.
As it turns out, within this traditional Walrasian general equilibrium framework^ abstract
ing from the intermediation process is a perfectly sensible modelling strategy. In particular,
transforming the passive Walrasian Auctioneer into an active earnings-driven intermediary
would add nothing essential to the story. In any competitive equilibrium, Walras' Law en
sures that the V2tlue of any good in excess supply is zero. The value of the goods delivered by
the Walrasian Auctioneer must therefore equal the value of the goods he receives, implying
that his net earnings are necesseirily zero. Consequently, even if the Walrasian Auctioneer
were to have aii earnings objective, the set of competitive equilibria would not be affected.
The difficulty arises when this modelUng strategy is extended to other general equilibrium
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contexts. For example, the overlapping generations (OG) model is a general equilibrium
model of a dynamic open-ended economy incorporating birth and death. Consequently,
unlike the traditional Walrasian general equilibrium model, an OG model necessarily includes
infinitely many consumers and infinitely many goods. As noted by Wilson (1981), the value
of the aggregate social endowment in an OG model can be infinite in equilibrium, implying
that the usual implications of Walras' Law need not hold. In particular, goods in excess
supply need not have a zero value in equilibrium.
The possibility that positively valued excess supplies can exist in equilibrium is demon
strated, below, for a simple OG model under standard technology and preference assump
tions. No consumer or producer has any claim upon these excess supplies. Rather, they
represent the net earnings accruing to intermediation activity. Consequently, another way
to state this finding is that intermediaries in OG models can potentially satisfy the trade and
credit plans of consumers and producers and still achieve positive net earnings in equilibrium.
Why hcisn't this observation been made previously? Interestingly, the reason appears to
lie in a seemingly innocuous change which researchers have made in the traditional Walrasian
general equilibrium assumptions when adapting these assumptions to the OG model. While
the traditional Walrasian general equilibrium approach has been to state market clearing
conditions as inequalities which allow for an excess supply of goods in equilibrium, the
traditional OG approach has been to state market clearing conditions as equalities which
require that supply exactly equal demand in each market. Consequently, in OG models
as opposed to traditional Walrasian general equilibrium models, positive net e^nings for
intermediaries are ruled out a priori.
The use of a strict supply-equal-demand definition of market clearing in the OG model
is overly restrictive. No consumer or producer cares whether supply exactly equals demand.
Consumers and producers are happy as long as their trade and credit plans are realized. How
ever, once this strict definition of market clearing is weakened to the traditional Walrasian
definition allowing for excess supply in equilibrium, the OG intermediary can potentially
achieve positive net earnings. Consequently, the OG model is fundamentally incomplete
without a further clarification of the intermediary's stance towards net earnings.
This paper explores the implications for intermediation in OG models when market clear
ing conditions are relaxed to inequalities, thus allowing for excess supply. Section I sets out
the bcisic structure of a simple illustrative OG model, a pure exchange desert island economy
referred to as the "Basic Coconut Economy." Two alternative definitions of equilibrium are
considered for the Basic Coconut Economy in sections II and III. A traditional OG mod
elling of equilibrium with strict supply-equal-demand market clearing conditions is given
in section II. The resulting economy is referred to as the "Traditional Coconut Economy."
Section III sets out an alternative extension of the Basic Coconut Economy, referred to as
the "Nontraditional Coconut Economy," in which market during conditions take the form
of inequalities allowing for excess supply.
The Traditional Coconut Economy is shown to have precisely two. stationary equilibria.
Because the strict market clearing conditions rule out the possibihty of excess supplies in
equilibrium, the intermediary necessarily achieves zero net earnings in both of these equi
libria. In contrast, the Nontraditional Coconut Economy is shown to have infinitely many
nontraditional stationary equilibria with positively priced goods in excess supply, in addition
to the two stationary equilibria possessed by the Traditional Coconut Economy. In each of
the nontraditional stationary equilibria, the intermediary achieves positive net earnings.
Interpretations for the Traditional and Nontraditional Coconut Economies are provided
in section IV. It is shown that the Traditional Coconut Economy can be viewed as an OG
economy in which trade and credit arrangements are mediated either by a fixed supply of fiat
money, or by a passive central clearing house whose only objective is to ensure that supply
equals demand in each market. On the other hand, the Nontraditional Coconut Economy
can be viewed as an OG economy in which "trade and credit arrangements are mediated
either by a nondecreasing supply of fiat money, or by a passive central clearing house whose
only objective is to ensure that the trade and credit plans of all consumers and producers
can be carried out.
Although intermediation is passively focused on some type of coordination objective
in both the Traditional and Nontraditional Coconut Economies, the intermediary in the
Nontraditional Coconut Economy can potentially achieve positive net earnings. Since in
termediaries in reality are primarily interested in net earnings, not trade coordination per
se, it is suggested in section V that a new approach to OG modelling might fruitfully be
adopted. First, market clearing conditions should be weakened to inequalities allowing for
excess supply, as is done for the Nontraditional Coconut Economy. And second, at least
one active earnings-driven intermediary should be incorporated as an agent whose earnings
objective must be satisfied in order for an equilibrium to exist.
The question then arises whether the incorporation of an active earnings-driven interme
diary into the Nontraditional Coconut Economy has any economically significant effect on
the set of equiUbria. In section VI, the answer is shown to be affirmative. Once such an
intermediary is introduced, the only possible stationary equilibrium for the Nontraditional
Coconut Economy is a single Pareto efficient equilibrium. At each other potential stationary
equilibrium, the intermediary would perceive the possibility of increasing its net earnings in
each period at the given set of prices by an appropriate rearrangement of its receipts and
deliveries.
What about the efficiency properties of the equilibria which can be price-supported with
active earnings-driven intermediation in more general OG contexts? Although this question
is still under study, section VI reviews some preliminary findings along these lines from
Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991a,b) which suggest the potential welfare-enhancing power of
active intermediation. For example, for the well-known OG model developed by Tirole
(1985), a generalization of the Traditional Coconut Economy, it is shown in Pingle and
Tesfatsion (1991b) that the introduction of a corporate intermediary with an appropriate
dividend (net earnings) objective can guarantee that all equihbria, both stationary and
nonstationary, are Pareto efficient.
1. The Basic Coconut Economy
The Basic Coconut Economy is a pure exchange overlapping generations (OG) economy
which begins in period 1 and extends into the infinite future. The rate of population growth
is constant and equal to zero. For simplicity, it is assumed that only one consumer is born
in each period. The "generation t consumer" is born at the beginning of period t, fives for
two periods, and then dies. Consumers in generations t > 1 are identical aside from time
of birth. In the initicd period 1, the population of the economy consists of one generation
1 young consumer and one old consumer, referred to as the "generation 0 consumer." The
generation 0 consumer dies at the end of period 1.
The economy has only one consumable resource, coconuts, assumed to be completely
perishable and divisible. Adopting the standard convention that goods are distinguished by
date of availability, the coconuts available during period t represent "good i." The economy
thus has an infinite number of goods. Each consumer gathers a positive amount of
coconuts when young, referred to as his "coconut endowment." Old consumers are not
nimble enough to gather any coconuts.
The young age and old age coconut consumptions of the generation t consumer are
denoted by the consumption profile (cf,c®^i). The lifetime consumption preferences of the
generation t young consumer are represented by a utility function which is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave. For reasons to be
clarified below, it is assumed as a regularity condition that the consumer's marginal rate of
substitution at the endowment profile (ti;^,0) is less than one, i.e.,
(1) MRS{w^,0) = ^7l«0)/C/2(u;^0) < 1.
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The utility of the generation 0 consumer is assumed to be a strictly increasing function of
^ his coconut consumption in period 1.
Direct coconut-for-coconut trades between a young consumer and an old consumer in any
given period are not possible, since old consumers have no coconuts; but, in any case, such
trades of a single type of resource would not be welfare enhancing. In contrast, intertemporal
coconut trades can enhance the welfare of consumers.-That is, consumers might benefit from
givingup some of their coconut endowment when young in return for receiving"coconuts when
old.
Since coconuts are perishable, they cannot be stored. The completion of an intertemporal
trade therefore requires the future involvement of as-yet unborn consumers. When a young
consumer transfers coconuts to an old consumer in some period t in hopes of receiving
. coconuts when old, he must depend on the young consumer born in period <+ 1 to furnish
these additional coconuts. But the generation i 4-1 young consumer will have no incentive
. ?
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to give up these coconuts unless he in turn is guaranteed to receive coconuts from the next
? generation, and so forth.
Consequently, intertemporal trades in the Basic Coconut Economy are necessarily inter-
generational trades; and they will not take place unless facihtated by a medium of exchange
which also acts as a store of value. Since the Basic Coconut Economy lacks any durable
consumable good, such a medium of exchange must represent an accounting convention or
an intrinsically useless durable object which somehow has gained social acceptance as a unit
of account.
I
As is standard in general equilibrium models, the precise nature of the intermediation
process will be abstracted from here by assuming that intertemporal trades in the Basic
Coconut Economy are facihtated by a price system p = (pi,p25'")5 where pt denotes-the
price of coconuts in period t. Prices might be measured in terms of a numeraire good such as
period 1 coconuts, or in terms of some monetary unit of account. Given p, the value of any
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coconuts sold in period t can be stored to enable subsequent coconut purchases in period
i+1.
Given a nonnegative price sequence p, the lifetime utility majdmization problem faced
by the young consumer in any generation t>i takes the form:
(2) max (7(4,c°^i)
with respect to the coconut consumption profile (c< subject to the lifetime budget and
nonnegativity constraints
PtCt + Pt+iCt+i = ;
c?>0, c?+i>0.
Solutions to (2) entailing positive amounts of coconut consumption in each period of life are
characterized by the first-order condition
(3) MRS{4A+i) = P<M+i ,
together with the lifetime budget constraint. For simplicity, it will hereafter be assumed
that solutions to (2) satisfy the first-order condition (3) for all price sequences p satisfying
Pt/Pi+i >
n. Traditional OG Modelling of Equilibrium for the Basic Coconut Economy
Market clearing conditions are equilibrium conditions which guarantee that all trading
plans can be actualized. In an attempt to define these equilibrium conditions in the weakest
manner possible, theorists working in the context of traditional Walrasian general equilib
rium models involving finitely many consumers and finitely many goods often state these
market clearing conditions as inequalities which allow for excess supply in equilibrium. In
contrast, beginning with the seminal paper by Samuelson (1958; p. 470), and continuing to
the present, it hcis become standard for theorists studying OG economies to state market
clearing conditions in a stronger form: namely, as requirements that supply exactly equal
demand in each market.^
The implications of this strengthening of the market clearing definition will be taken up
in the next section. In this section, we will follow the OG tradition and state market clearing
conditions as equalities. In particular, all markets will be said to clear when the supply of
coconuts equals the demand for coconuts in each period, i.e., when
(4) + Ct , t> I .
Given a price sequence p for the Basic Coconut Economy, a (traditional) equilibrium
will be said to exist if two conditions are satisfied. First, each young consumer solves the
lifetime utiHty maximization problem (2), conditional on p. And second, all markets clear
in the sense that condition (4) holds. A Basic Coconut Economy for which this traditional
OG definition of equiHbrium is used will hereafter be referred to as a Traditional Coconut
Economy.
If the generation 0 consumer is unable to obtain any coconuts prior to the initial round of
trade in period 1, then the only equilibrium possible for the Traditional Coconut Economy is
the harsh no-trade equilibrium in which each young consumer consumes his coconut endow
ment and old consumers consume nothing. On the other hand, the generation 0 consumer
might have a source of real purchasing power—e.g., some form of credit—despite his inability
to engage in coconut-gathering activities. Thus, a fundamental question first raised by Gale
(1973, p. 23), and explored below in section IV, is how this initial source of purchasing power
might come about.
Call an equilibrium "stationary" if the terms of trade between any two successive periods
^For example, see the definitions of market clearing used by Diamond (1965; p. 1132), Cass and Yaari
(1966; p. 354), Shell (1971; p. 1004), Gale (1973; p. 18), Cass-Okuno-Zilcha (1979; p. 46), Baleisko and
Shell (1980; p. 285),Wilson (1981; p. 101),Scheinkman (1983; p. 7), Woodford (1984; Section I), Yamamoto
(1984; p. 14), Dechert and Yamamoto (1985; p. 10), and Tirole (1985; p. 1502).
axe constant over time, i.e.,'if
(5) = R, t > 1 ,
where R is an interest factor equal to one plus a stationary rate of interest. As shown by
Gale (1973), any economy having the basic structure of the Traditional Coconut Economy
has exactly two stationary equiUbria. Retracing Gale's logic, this fact can be deduced from
the consumer budget constraints and the market clearing conditions.
Condition (5) implies that each optimizing young consumer in a stationary equilibrium
will choose the same coconut consumption profile, say (c^jc"). To see this, simply multiply
the lifetime budget constraint for the generation t young consumer by l/pt, t > 1. Thus, in
a stationary equilibrium, the budget constraint for each generation t young consumer can be
written without loss of generality as
(6) c'' = - c^] .
Given the stationary consumption profile for generations < > 1, the market clearing
condition (4) for periods t>2 becomes
(7) u;'' = + c° .
The market clearing condition (4) for period <= 1, with c\ = c^, then forces the coconut
consumption c° of the generation 0 consumer to equal c®.
The stationary consumption profile (c^, c") must satisfy conditions (6) and (7) simulta
neously. Combining these conditions yields the condition
(8) 0 = [R-l][w^-c^ .
Exactly two stationary equilibria satisfy condition (8). One stationary equilibrium is
characterized by the stationary consumption profile = (zu^,0), where each young con
sumer consumes his coconut endowment and each old consumer makes due with nothing.
9
The interest factor IV" associated with this no-trade stationary equilibrium satisfies =
MRS{w^yO) < 1, implying that the interest rate —1 is negative. The second stationary
equiUbrium is characterized by the stationary consumption profile c = associated
with the interest factor A = 1, implying that the interest rate R —1 is equal to zero. At c,
each young consumer abstains from consuming a portion of his coconut endowment w^. The
stationary equihbrium consumption profiles c"' and c are depicted in Figure 1; these profiles
satisfy the strong market clearing (7), which appears as Line L in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Note that the interest rate ^ —1 = 0 associated with the second stationary equilibrium
I
coincides with the population growth rate for the Basic Coconut Economy. The popula
tion growth rate is traditionally referred to as the "golden-rule interest rate" because of its
desirable efficiency properties. Indeed, as Gale (1973) observes, the no-trade consumption
profile associated with R^ is Pareto inefficient, while the golden-rule consumption profile
c associated with R is Pareto efficient,
III. Nontraditional Modelling of Equilibrium for the Basic Coconut Economy
Suppose, instead, that market clearing conditions are introduced into the Basic Coconut
Economy in the form of inequalities. That is, suppose that all markets are defined to clear
when
(9) wy > t>\ .
As noted in section II, the market clearing conditions (9) are weaker than those traditionally
used in OG analyses.
Given any particular price sequence p for the Basic Coconut Economy, a (nontraditional)
equilibrium will be said to exist if two conditions are met. First, each young consumer solves
the lifetime utility maximization problem (2), conditional on p. And second, all markets
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clear in the sense that condition (9) holds. A Basic Coconut Economy for which this weaker
concept of equilibrium is used will hereafter be referred to as a Nontraditional Coconut
Economy.
Call an equilibrium for the Nontraditional Coconut Economy "stationary" if condition
(5) holds, i.e., if all consumers face the same stationary interest factor R. In any stationary
equilibrium, each young consumer in each generation < > 1 chooses the same stationary
coconut consumption profile, say Consequently, the market clearing conditions (9)
reduce to the condition
(10) > cf + c'' .
By definition, then, a consumption profile (c^,c°) can be price-supported as a stationary
equilibrium consumption profile for the Nontraditional Coconut Economy if and only if
it lies on the darkened portion of the offer curve depicted in Figure 1.^ This darkened
portion includes the consumption profiles and c, shown in Section II to be supportable
as stationary equilibrium consumption profiles for the Traditional Coconut Economy. These
profiles lie on line L in Figure 1, where condition (7) is satisfied and the supply of coconuts
^uals the demand for coconuts in each period t. However, all ,of the remaining consumption
profiles on the darkened portion of the offer curve satisfy
(11) + c" ,
meaning there is an excess supply of coconuts in each period t. Consequently, these pro
files violate the strict supply-equal-demand definition of market clearing, and hence are
not supportable as stationary equilibrium consumption profiles for the Traditional Coconut
Economy. The. weakening of the traditional 00 market clearing definition has therefore
resulted in a significant increase in the number of potential stationary equilibria.
^The offer curve drawn in Figure 1 exhibits gross substitutability, meaning that the generation t young
consumer desires to save more coconuts as the interest rate is increased. This particular preference assump
tion does not significantly affect the msiin issues addressed in this paper.
11
Moreover, in each nontraditional stationary equilibrium characterized by excess coconut
supply, the price of coconuts is nevertheless positive. To see this, note that the interest
factor R associated with any such equilibrium satisfies 0 < < R< R = \^ where R^ and
R are the interest factors associated with the two traditional stationary equilibria and c.
Consequently, it follows from condition (5) that the equilibriumprice for coconuts is positive
in each period t despite the fact that coconuts are in excess supply in each period t.
Why does the set of stationary equilibria change when the market clearing conditions
for the Traditional Coconut Economy are relaxed to inequalities? In general equilibrium
models which have a finite number of consumers and a finite number of goods, Walras' Law
holds. In such models, Walras' Law implies that if there does exist an excess supply of a
good in equilibrium, then that good will have a priceequal to zero. Walras' Law also implies
that the supply of a good must equal the demand for the good if the price of the good is
strictly positive. Thus, when Walras' Law holds and only positive price sequences are being
considered, stating market clearing conditions as equaUties is not any more restrictive than
stating them as inequahties. The same set of equilibria results in either case.
However, relaxing the market clearing conditions for the Traditional Coconut Economy—
an OG economy with infinitely many consumers and infinitely many goods—expands the set
of equilibria. As has previously been recognized (see, e.g., Wilson (1981)), a basic problem
in OG economies is that the value of the aggregate endowment, here can
be infinite in equilibrium. In this case, the standard implications of Walras' Law do not
necessarily hold. We have, in fact, shown that the Nontraditional Coconut Economy can
generate equilibria where coconuts, in excess supply have a positive price.
IV. Interpreting the Traditional and Nontraditional OG Approaches
Given the Basic Coconut Economy described in section I, is there any reason why equi
libria involving excess supply should be ruled out a priori by the introduction of market
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clearing conditions in the form of equalities? The answer must surely be no.
The only agents in the Basic Coconut Economy are consumers. No consumer cares
whether or not supply exactly equals demand. Consumers are happy as long as they can
satisfy their coconut demands at the given set of prices. Given a stationary interest factor
R satisf5dng < R < the coconut demands of all consumers can be satisfied and there
is a positive amount of coconuts left over in each period t. Although such a situation is
clearly wasteful, there is no agent in the Coconut Economy to ensure that such waste does
not occur.
Providing an interpretation of the traditional OG approach, where market clearing con
ditions are stated as equalities, and the nontraditional OG approach where market clearing
conditions axe stated as inequalities, requires a more detailed ana,lysis of the mediation
process. When considering the mediation of intertemporal trade for an OG model with a
structure similar to the Basic Coconut Economy, Gale (1973) examined two ideas: (i) in
tertemporal trade is mediated by fiat money, i.e., unbacked currency with no intrinsic value;
and (ii) intertemporal trade is mediated by a central clearing house. Consider each of these,
in turn, for the Basic Coconut Economy.
Suppose, first, that intertemporal trade in the Basic Coconut Economy is mediated by
otherwise useless palm fronds, assumed to be durable. Thus, intertemporal coconut trades
can now take place if the generation t young consumer is willing to give coconuts to the
generation ^—1 old consumer in exchange for palm fronds in each period t >1. For trade to
occur in the initial period 1, the generation 0 old consumer must be endowed with an initial
quantity of palm fronds in period 1.
The price pt for period t coconuts is now assumed to be a spot price measured in palm
fronds; that is, pt denotes the quantity of palm fronds received in period t in exchange for
one coconut. Letting m« denote the palm frond demand of the generation t young consumer,
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the lifetime utility maximization problem facing this young consumer takes the form:
(12) max C/(c|',<+i)
with respect c^, and m< subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
< ptw^ ;
Phic?+i < Pi+iUJ" + ;
c?>0, c?+i>0, mi>0.
Since the utility function U(') is assumed to be strictly increasing, impl3dng that con
sumers are never satiated, the young age and old age budget constraints in (12) will be
satisfied as equalities in any equihbrium, and all prices will be strictly positive. The young
age budget constraint of the generation t consumer and the old age budget constraint of the
generation t —1 consumer, taken as equalities, together imply that the condition
(13) pt[w^ - c? - C(] + [mt-i - m(] = 0
must hold in each period / > 1. From condition (13) and the positivity of pt, it follows that
if there is an excess supply of coconuts during period t, then there will also be an excess
demand for palm fronds. That is, if > c? —c®, then mt-i < mt. Consequently, if the
supply of palm fronds is held constant over time, an excess supply of coconuts is not possible
in equihbrium.
This discussion suggests the following interpretations for the traditional and nontradi-
tional OG approaches. Intertemporal trade in the traditional OG approach is essentially
mediated by a fixed supply of fiat money. In contrast, intertemporal trade in the nontradi-
tional OG approach is essentially mediated by a possibly increasing supply of fiat money.
More precisely, in the latter approach, a positive excess coconut supply —c°] in any
period t can potentially be sustained by a positive injection [mt —mt-i] of fiat money.
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Now consider, instead, a version of the Basic Coconut Economy in which intertemporal
coconut trades are mediated by a central clearing house. The generation 0 consumer is
assumed to have some amount of credit on account with the clearing house which can be
used to obtain coconuts from the clearing house in period 1. To simplify the exposition, we
again focus exclusively on stationary equilibria.
Given any stationary interest factor where ^ R ^ R, all young consumers in
generations t > 1 desire to consume the same amount of coconuts, say c^. Consequently,
all young consumers also desire to save the same amount of coconuts: namely, s = —c^.
During period I, the generation t young consumer delivers s coconuts to the clearing house in
I
exchange for credit to buy Rs coconuts in period i + 1. Also during period the generation
t —1 old consumer receives Rs coconuts from the clearing house in exchange for s coconuts
supplied to the clearing house in period t—l. It follows that, during each period the clearing
house receives s coconuts and must in turn deliver Rs coconuts. That is, the clearing house
receives a net of [1 —R]s coconuts.
If either R = R^ (implying s = 0) or R = R (i.e., R = 1), this net coconut amount
is zero. That is, in each period i the quantity of coconuts delivered by the clearing house
to the generation t —l old consumer is equal to the quantity of coconuts received from the
generation t young consumer. Note that R^ and R are the interest factors associated with
the two stationary equilibria and c for the Traditional Coconut Economy.
This suggests another interpretation of the traditional OG approach. Intertemporal trade
is brokered by an intermediary—e.g., a central clearing house—whose only objective is to
ensure that the quantity of each good received is equal to the quantity of each good delivered.
Given the stringency of its trade coordination objective, the traditional intermediary is forced
to have zero net earnings.
On the other hand, if R^ < R < R, then during each period t the net coconut receipts
of the clearing house are positive, meaning the clearing house can satisfy all coconut con-
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sumption demands and still have some amount of coconuts left over. No consumer has any
claim on these net coconut receipts. Therefore, they might rightly be considered to be the
net earnings of the clearing house received in payment for its intermediation activities. This
describes the situation that occurs in an excess supply equilibrium for the Nontraditional
Coconut Economy.
This suggests another interpretation of the nontraditional OG approach. Intertemporal
trade is brokered by an intermediary—e.g., a central clearing house—whose only objective is
to ensure that the consumption demands of all consumers are satisfied. The nontraditional
intermediary does not care if its inflow of goods is equal to its outflow in each period t. It
merely requires that its inflow be at least great enough to meet its outflow requirements.
Consequently, the nontraditional intermediary can have positive net earnings in equilibrium
whereas the traditional intermediary cannot.
V. A New Approach to OG Modelling
The discussion presented in the previous section raises a fundamental issue. How should
intermediation be modelled for dynamic open-ended economies incorporating birth and
death, that is, for OG economies?
Thus far we have demonstrated three findings for the Basic Coconut Economy. First,
intertemporal trade can be brokered by an intermediary. Second, it is possible for the
intermediary to have positive net earnings in each period t while responsibly meeting all of
its obligations to consumers. And third, the stringent trade coordination objective implicitly
assigned to the intermediary under the traditional OG definition of equilibrium rules out the
possibility of positive net earnings for the intermediary a priori.
Institutions which function as intermediaries in reality are not concerned with trade
coordination per se. To the contrary, as for producers, the basic objective of intermediaries
in the real world concerns net earnings. The satisfying of customer demands is not the
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overriding objective. Rather, customer demands are met in order to improve the bottom
line. Consequently, we suggest that a fruitful approach to the modelhng of intermediation
in OG economies would be one which recognizes and permits the possibility of positive net
earnings for intermediaries. Zero net earnings then becomes a possible characteristic of
equilibrium outcomes rather than an a priori imposed restriction.
Specifically, we propose two fundamental modifications of the traditional OG modelling
approach. First, weaken market clearing conditions to inequalities which allow for excess
supply, as is done in the Nontraditional Coconut Economy. Second, include at least one
active earnings-driven intermediary as an agent whose earnings objective must be satisfied
in order for an equilibrium to exist.
Vl. Active Earnings-Driven Intermediation in OG Models: An Example
To date, we have explored the economic implications of active intermediation in two
concrete OG settings. In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991a), we consider the implications of
cLctive intermediation for a pure exchange OG economy first described by Samuelson (1958).
In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991b), a similar analysis is undertaken for the private production
OG economy investigated by Diamond (1965) and later generalized by Tirole (1985) to
include the possibility of bubble asset investment. In each setting, we find that active
intermediation has strong efficiency implications. This section briefly reviews our findings
for the Diamond-Tirole economy.
The only intermediary in the Diamond-Tirole economy is an implicitly present Walrasian
Auctioneer concerned with the coordination of trade and credit arrajigements, but not with
the optimization of these arrangements. As Tirole sKows, the First Welfare Theorem fails
for the Diamond-Tirole economy. Unless initial bubble asset holdings are set just right, the
economy will follow a Pareto inefficient competitive equilibrium path.
In Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991b), the Diamond-Tirole economy is generalized to include a
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corporate intermediary, owned by consumer-shareholders, which distributes all net earnings
as dividends to shareholders. The efficiency properties of the resulting "Brokered Economy"
then depend on the exact modelling of the intermediary's earnings objective.
One possibility is that the corporate intermediary behaves as a Walrasian Auctioneer,
i.e., a price-setting agent concerned only with trade and credit coordination. It is shown that
the Brokered Economy reduces to the Diamond-Tirole economy in this case. In particular,
competitive equilibria need not be Pareto efficient. The Traditional Coconut Economy, a
special case of the Diamond-Tirole economy, illustrates this result. As shown in section
II, the Pareto-inefficient no-trade consumption profile can be supported as a
stationary equilibrium consumption profile for the Traditional Coconut Economy.
Another possibility, however, is that the corporate intermediary is a price-taking agent
with an earnings objective. In this case, it is shown that Pareto inefficient outcomes can
not be supported as competitive equilibria for the Brokered Economy under any reasonable
specification of the intermediary's earnings objective. In particular, given any Pareto inef
ficient outcome, the corporate intermediary would perceive the possibility of increasing its
net earnings in each and every period.
The Nontraditional Coconut Economy set out in section III, a special case of the Brokered
Economy, can be used to illustrate this result. Given a price-taking earnings-driven interme
diary for this economy, the only consumption profile which can reasonably be supported as
a stationary equilibrium consumption profile is the Pareto efficient golden-rule profile c. As
explained in section IV, given any other possible stationary equiHbrium consumption profile,
i.e., any other consumption profile lying on the darkened portion of the offer curve depicted
in Figure 1, the corresponding interest factor R satisfies R < 1. The net earnings received
by the price-taking intermediary in each period t per each unit of savings it brokers are
then given by [1 —J?] > 0. Consequently, the intermediary would perceive the possibility of
obtaining arbitrarily large net earnings in each period t by an appropriate rearrangement of
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its receipt and delivery plans at the current interest rate R —I.
In short, the Pareto inefficient outcomes which arise as equilibria for the Diamond-Tirole
economy are ruled out as equihbria for the Brokered Economy under any reasonable speci
fication of an earnings objective for the corporate intermediary. But what about the Pareto
efficiency of equilibria for the Brokered Economy?
The answer to this question depends upon the precise specification of the corporate
intermediary's earnings objective. What form this objective should take is still under in
vestigation. However, some preliminary results along these lines are reported in Pingle and
Tesfatsion (1991b) which suggest the potential welfare-enhancing power of active intermedi
ation.
Specifically, after explaining why the usual specification of a present value profit maxi
mization objective is ill-defined for the corporate intermediary, an illustrative example of a
dividend (net earnings) objective is considered for the intermediary which takes into account
the varied interests of all shareholders: namely, maximize the minimum per capita dividend
distributed to shareholders over time. Given this dividend objective, it is shown that the
market value of the corporate intermediary attains its maximum feasible Value in each period
and all competitive equilibria for the Brokered Economy are Pareto efficient.
The key fact used to estabUsh these findings is that a solution exists for the corporate
intermediary's dividend distribution problem if and only if certain price conditions hold which
are analagous to the Cass-Balasko-Shell transversality conditions shown by Balasko and Shell
(1980) to be necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency in the context of a pure exchange
OG model. The interesting point here is that an economic interpretation is provided for
these price conditions; they are the "transversality conditions" for the optimizing corporate
intermediary.
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Figure 1: Stationary Equilibria
